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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code and Rule 4(a) of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court.

This is an appeal from the Order of

the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick, which granted (a) McDonald's Motion to Dismiss
Sandy City's Verified Complaint, (b) McDonald's and Salt Lake
County's respective Motions for Summary Judgment against Sandy
City, and (c) McDonald's Motion to Strike Affidavit, and which
denied Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for determination in
this appeal:
1.

Whether

the

lower

court

erred

in

granting

McDonald's motion to dismiss, ruling as a matter of law that the
legal doctrine of laches barred Sandy City's Verified Complaint,
where McDonald's made no showing of damage, injury or prejudice
resulting

from

Sandy

City's

alleged

untimely

filing of its

Verified Complaint, and where Sandy City's filing was, in fact,
timely.
2.

Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in

its construction and interpretation of applicable state statutes,
thus allowing Salt Lake County to act in excess of its statutory
authority.
1

3.
interpreting

Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in
and applying

state statutes contrary

to express

constitutional and legislative objectivesf purposes and intent,
and contrary to sound public policy.
4.

Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in

its interpretation and application of Salt Lake County ordinances,
thus allowing Salt Lake County to act in excess of its authority.
5.

Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in

striking an affidavit, with attached appraisal, submitted by Sandy
City in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.
legislative
development).
2.

Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-401 (setting forth the
policy

of

the

State

of Utah relative to urban

For full text see Addendum "B," attached hereto.
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-1-104(11):
"Urban development" means a housing subdivision
involving more than 15 residential units with an
average of less than one acre per residential unit
or a commercial or industrial development for which
cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all
phases.

3.

Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-418:
Urban development shall not be approved or
permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in
the unincorporated territory which the municipality
has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy
declaration, if a municipality is willing to annex
the territory proposed for such development under
the standards and requirements set forth in this
chapter. . . .
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant

McDonald's

predecessors

in interest,

Priest, Yeates, Kjar and Smoot (hereinafter "P.Y.K.S.") purchased
approximately

4.18

acres of commercial property

(hereinafter

"property") from Mickelson Enterprises in 1987 for approximately
$890,000, said Property being located on the northwest corner of
10600 South and 1300 East in unincorporated Salt Lake County.

On

or about April 9, 1987, P.Y.K.S., acting as agent for Mickelson
Enterprises, made application

to Salt Lake County Development

Services Division for a change in zoning for the property from
Rural Residential to Commercial.

See copy of Application, at p.

322, Record on Appeal (R.O.A.); Affidavit of K. Delyn Yeates, p.
209, R.O.A.; and McDonald's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of it's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "McDonald's Memorandum"), at p. 132,
R.O.A.
2.

The

change

in

zoning

request

referred

to in

paragraph 1, next above, on its face indicated the developers'
intent

that

"homogeneity

the property be a
of

theme

"commercial

subdivision" with

and development," and

listed multiple

potential commercial "tenants," including defendant McDonald's,
who had expressed "interest" in the development.
Application, supra.

3

See copy of

4.
property

P.Y.K.S.

sold

to Chevron U.S.A.,

station-convenience store.

approximately

.7 acres

Inc., for construction

of

the

of a gas

Salt Lake County granted a conditional

use permit for that construction over Sandy City's protest. After
Sandy

City's

appeal

of that grant to the Salt Lake County

Commission was denied by the Commission, Sandy City filed suit in
Third District Court.

Summary Judgment was granted by Judge Uno

against Sandy City, and the matter (hereinafter referred to as the
"Chevron Action") is now on appeal before the Utah Court of
Appeals.

See McDonald's Memorandum, supra, at pp. 133-36, R.O.A.
5.

P.Y.K.S. then entered into an agreement to sell

approximately 1.3 acres of the property to McDonald's.
137, R.O.A.

McDonald's 1.3 acres were adjacent to and immediately

to the north of Chevron's .7 acres.
6.
authorized

McDonald's,
agent, then

conditional use permit.
7.

Ld. at p.

See id. at p. 138, R.O.A.

acting

petitioned

as

the

Salt

property

Lake

owner's

County

for a

Id.

The Salt Lake County Planning Commission approved

Chevron's conditional use permit on October 13, 1987.

One week

later, on October 21, 1987, the Salt Lake County Commission upheld
the decision of the Planning Commission's approval.
October

27, 1987, the Planning Commission approved McDonald's

application for conditional use.
Lake

Then, on

County

Commission

upheld

On December 9, 1987, the Salt
the decision of the Planning
4

Commission approving McDonald's application, denying Sandy City's
appeal,

and

then

issued

its

findings

and

formally granted

conditional use to McDonald's on or about January 13, 1988.
at pp. 137-39, R.O.A.
until March 24, 1988.
8.
the

parcel

Id.

McDonald's did not purchase the property
Id. at pp. 134-41, and 152, R.O.A.

Sandy City did not learn of McDonald's purchase of
until April of

1988, and on May

10, Sandy City

requested the Salt Lake County Attorney to enjoin the McDonald's
development.

On May 27, Sandy City received notice from the

County Attorney that no action would be taken.

On June 13, 1988,

Sandy

See Sandy City's

City

filed

its Verified Complaint.

Verified Complaint, at pp. 5-6, 15 and 27-29, R.O.A.
9.

The property was located within areas included in

Salt Lake County's Little Cottonwood District Development Plan,
which was part of Salt Lake County's Master Plan.

The Development

Plan was a ten (10) year plan approved in 1976, and expired by its
terms in 1985.

No new master plan had been adopted by Salt Lake

County at any time pertinent here.

See District Development Plan,

at p. 222, R.O.A.; Salt Lake County's Memorandum in Support of
it's Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 233-34, R.O.A.
10.

The

property abuts the municipal boundaries of

Sandy City, and is located within an unincorporated "island"

5

within Sandy City limits.

See Sandy City's Verified Complaint,

supra, at p. 4, R.O.A.
11.

Sandy

City

has

adopted

an

Annexation

Policy

Declaration under authority of and consistent with state statute.
A copy of said Declaration is attached to Sandy City's Verified
Complaint, and the map portion thereof shows that the property
here in question falls within said Declaration.

JEcl. at pp. 4 and

23-25, R.O.A.
12.

McDonald's agreed to purchase its 1.3 acre parcel

of the property for $300,000.

See Affidavit of Roy Drake, and

exhibits attached thereto, at pp. 305-320, R.O.A.
13.

An MAI appraisal estimated the total costs needed

to improve McDonald's 1.3 acre parcel, excluding land value, to
fall within the range of $650,000 to $825,000.

See Affidavit of

Gary Free at pp. 328-29, R.O.A., and his Appraisal Report, at pp.
323.1-323.5, R.O.A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court's dismissal of Sandy City's Verified
Complaint on the basis of laches was erroneous and contrary to law
because (a) Sandy City's Verified Complaint seeking extraordinary
relief from a decision by the Salt Lake County Commission was
Sandy City's only available remedy, there being no statutory
appeal procedure, and the filing thereof by Sandy City was timely
6

filed after Sandy City had exhausted its administrative remedies,
and (b) McDonald's made no showing of damage, injury or prejudice
resulting from the alleged delay by Sandy City in filing its
Verified Complaint, as is required before laches may be applied as
an affirmative defense to bar a complaint.
The

lower

court

erred

as a matter of

law in its

construction and application of statutory provisions governing
urban development in unincorporated territory within one-half mile
of a municipality's

jurisdictional limits, and in doing so it

abrogated Utah law governing statutory construction.
court's ruling disregarded express and unambiguous

The lower
legislative

objectives and intent, and strictly construed statutory language
which, by law, should have been liberally construed.

As a result,

the lower court wrongfully allowed Salt Lake County to act in
excess of its authority in approving a conditional use permit for
McDonald's.

Because Salt Lake County acted ultra vires, however,

the permit granted to McDonald's is void, and the McDonald's
development is unlawful because it has received no approval from
Sandy City.
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, does not apply
here because this action and the Chevron Action (the prior case
upon which respondents' here have based their estoppel argument),
have

different

facts

and

different procedural postures, and

according to Utah law such differences prevent application of
7

issue preclusion to bar Sandy City's Verified Complaint.

Thus,

its ruling that collateral estoppel barred Sandy City's Verified
Complaint was contrary to Utah law and should be reversed.
Finally,

the lower court's ruling which

struck the

Affidavit and MAI Appraisal of Gary Free should be reversed
because the lower court considered the content and substance of
the

affidavit

strike.

and appraisal, thus making moot

its ruling to

In addition, the affidavit and appraisal established

prima facie foundation for the expert opinion expressed therein,
which, if given at trial, would be admissible.

Accordingly, the

expert appraisal is admissible, and the order to strike the same
was contrary to law and should be reversed.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the
lower court's Order and remand this action with an order to the
Court below to enter summary judgment in favor of Sandy City, or,
in the alternative, remand for trial.

8

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL OF SANDY
CITY'S COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS OF LACHES
SHOULD BE REVERSED
A.

Standard of Review
The lower court ruled, as a matter of law, that Sandy

City's Verified Complaint should be dismissed on the basis of
laches.

See Order Granting Motions to Dismiss and for Summary

Judgment

of

Salt Lake County and McDonald's

Corporation and

McDonald Corporation's Motion to Strike, and Denying Sandy City's
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order"), at p.
571-577, R.O.A., copy attached hereto as Addendum "A."

On review

of the lower court's Order, this Court must apply the "analytical
standard required of the trial court."

See Lucky Seven Rodeo

Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).

This is

the standard of review for summary judgments and must be applied
here because the "order recited it was based on the pleadings, the
affidavits on file, and arguments of counsel [and] [t]herefore,
the order granting the motion to dismiss was, in fact, a summary
judgment."

Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah,

561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977); see also Order, supra, at p. 575,
R.O.A.

In applying this standard of review, this Court is free to

reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions reached in granting
the motion.

Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. , 755 P. 2d at 752; see also
9

Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985)
(appellate court gives no deference to lower court's conclusions
of law which are reviewed for correctness).
Laches is an equitable defense which requires the party
asserting it to establish two separate elements before the defense
may be applied by the court.
undue

delay

First, there must be a showing of

as a result of a clear lack of diligence, and

secondly, there must be shown some identifiable damage, injury, or
prejudice resulting directly from that unwarranted delay.
Leavor v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1263 (Utah 1980).

See

Thus, for this

Court to affirm the lower court's granting of McDonald's Motion to
Dismiss on the basis of laches, it must conclude as a matter of
law that

(a) the Verified Complaint filed by Sandy City was

untimely, (b) the untimeliness was a result of a clear lack of
diligence

on the part of Sandy City, and

damaged,

injured, or prejudiced

(c) McDonald's was

as a direct result of that

unwarranted delay by Sandy City.

B.

Damage or Prejudice to McDonald's
Even assuming, arguendo, that Sandy City's action was

untimely, McDonald's has failed to establish the second required
element of the doctrine of laches; that is, that it was damaged,
injured or prejudiced as a result of an unwarranted delay.

Below,

McDonald's filed 62 pages of argument in memoranda form, four
10

separate affidavits with attachments totaling 31 pages, and 119
pages of attachments to its memoranda.

Yet, in these 212 pages,

McDonald's did not argue once, nor did it provide one shred of
evidence, that it had been damaged, injured, or prejudiced as a
direct result of Sandy City's alleged undue delay in filing this
action.

McDonald's made no allegation of damage in its Answer,

and, in fact, made no mention below of the doctrine of laches
except for the Fourth Defense in its Answer, wherein McDonald's
stated simply: "This action is barred by the doctrine of laches,
waiver, and estoppel."

See McDonald's Answer, at p. 70, R.O.A.

It is the well-established law in Utah that matters not
raised by parties in the trial court below cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal.

See Lane v. Messer, 731 P. 2d 488,

491 (Utah 1986); see also Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944
(Utah 1987).

The first time McDonald's argued that it had been

damaged by Sandy City's alleged untimely filing of its Verified
Complaint was in a motion for summary disposition filed with the
Supreme Court after Sandy City had filed its Docketing Statement
in

this

appeal.

See McDonald's

Memorandum

of

Points and

Authorities in Support of its Motion to Affirm the District Court
Order Dismissing this Case with Prejudice, at pp. 10-11, thereof.
Thus, it is clear from the record that McDonald's has
not shown, established, proven or even alleged that it was damaged
as a direct result of an untimely filing of Sandy City's Verified
11

Complaint.

Accordinglyf

the lower court's ruling, made as a

matter of law, that laches barred Sandy City's Verified Complaint,
was clearly erroneous and must be reversed by this Court.

C.

Sandy City's Verified Complaint Was Filed Timely
Although the lower court made no findings regarding the

timeliness

of the filing of Sandy City's Verified Complaint,

McDonald's argued below that Sandy City was required by Section
78-2a-3(2) (a) of the Utah Code to file an appeal with the Utah
Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days of the Salt Lake County
Commission's decision to affirm the Planning Commission's approval
of McDonald's conditional use permit.

McDonald's argument with

regard to untimeliness was based upon the assumption that the Salt
Lake County Commission's decision was a final order or decree of a
"state [or] local agency" requiring a formal appeal.
Code Ann.

Section

78-2a-3(2)(a)

(1987).

Section

See Utah
78-2a-3(4),

however, states that the Court of Appeals "shall comply with the
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of agency
adjudicative proceedings."

JEd. at Section 78-2a-3(4) (1987).

Code reference is to the Utah Administrative

The

Procedures Act.

Contrary to McDonald's position, however, the Act applies only to
state and not to local agencies.

See Davis County v. Clearfield

City, 756 P.2d 704, 706 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).

In fact, the Act

specifically excludes any application to any political subdivision
12

of

the

state, or

any

administrative

subdivision of the state.

unit

of

a

political

Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. Section

63-46b-2(l)(b) (1987).
Thus, a decision from a political subdivision of the
state or from one of its administrative units, which, in this
case, would be the Salt Lake County Commission, does not fall
within the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
and is not included within the jurisdictional parameters of the
Utah Court of Appeals.

See Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-2(l) (a)

(1987) (defines a state or local "agency" to exclude political
subdivisions of the state).

There being no statutory appeal

procedure for Sandy City to follow with regard to the Salt Lake
County Commission's decision, "other than to obtain review by the
traditional means of seeking an extraordinary writ," see Davis
County, 756 P. 2d at 707, the Verified Complaint filed by Sandy
City seeking an extraordinary writ from the District Court was the
appropriate avenue of remedy for Sandy City.

Accordingly, no

statutory thirty-day appeal limit, as argued below by McDonald's,
was applicable.
Furthermore, Rule

56B of

the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, governing extraordinary writs, does not establish a
time limit for filing the same. Nevertheless, Sandy City's filing
was made in a timely fashion.

Following the County Commission's

decision denying Sandy City's appeal from the Planning Commission
13

and soon after it learned that McDonald's had become the owner of
record of the real property here in question, Sandy City sought
relief from the Salt Lake County Attorney pursuant to Section 1727-23 of the Utah Code, which grants to the County Attorney
authority to "institute injunction, mandamus . . .

or any other

appropriate action or proceedings to prevent, enjoin . . .

or

remove the unlawful . . . use or act" violating a county zoning
law.

See Utah Code Ann. Section 17-27-23 (1953, as amended).

On

May 27, 1988, Sandy City received a response from the Salt Lake
County Attorney refusing to enjoin McDonald's development.
Sandy City's Verified Complaint, supra.

See

Sandy City then filed its

Verified Complaint on or about June 13, 1988, within thirty days
after it had exhausted all available administrative remedies.

Id.

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED SECTIONS
10-1-104(11) AND 10-2-418 OF THE UTAH CODE AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SANDY CITY BASED
THEREON SHOULD BE REVERSED AND SANDY CITY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED
A.

Utah Law of Statutory Construction
The courts of this state are required

to liberally

construe statutes with a view to effect the statute's purpose,
object, and legislative intent.
(1953, as amended).

See Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-2

The law also requires Utah courts to consider

each term and phrase of a statute, because the same "was used
14

advisably by the Legislature and
interpreted
meaning."

and

applied

. . . each term should be

according

to

its

usually

accepted

West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).

See also Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451
(1967) (courts must presume that "words and phrases were chosen
advisably to express legislative intent" and the courts should
apply them "in accordance with [their] literal wording").
In Section 10-2-401 of the Code, it is stated clearly
and unequivocally that it is the state's legislative policy and
intent

to

grant

municipalities

authority and responsibility

for

"urban governmental

to the state's

services essential for

sound urban development and for the protection of public health,
safety, and welfare in residential, commercial, and industrial
areas."

Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-401(2).

Where that urban

development takes place in unincorporated territory within onehalf mile of a municipality, Section 10-2-418 of the Code and the
express policy

statements

of the statute cited

above clearly

indicate that the State of Utah intended to grant municipalities
an overriding interest in that development far greater in scope
and application than the interest granted the county government in
which the proposed development is located.
Accordingly, in this dispute between Sandy City and Salt
Lake County over the development of property located within onehalf

mile

of

Sandy City's

jurisdictional boundaries
15

and the

resolution of the dispute centers on the interpretation of Section
10-2-418 of the Utah Code, it is clear that the lower court should
have liberally construed that statute with a view to effectuate
the state's policy of granting to Sandy City, rather than to Salt
Lake County, the primary responsibility for and paramount interest
in that development.

The lower court, however, failed to apply

this Utah law of statutory construction and, contrary to law,
strictly construed the statute against Sandy City in favor of Salt
Lake County, erroneously basing its summary judgment ruling on
that strict interpretation.

B.

Liberally Construing the Statutes

1.

"Urban Development"
Specific language from two statutory provisions is at

issue here.

The first provision is found at Section 10-2-418 and

reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Urban development shall not be improved or
permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the
unincorporated territory which the municipality has
proposed for a municipal expansion in its policy
declaration, if a municipality is willing to annex the
territory proposed for such development under the
standards and requirements set forth in this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-418.
at

issue

is

the

definition

The second statutory provision

provided

by statute

development," and is found at Section 10-1-104(11):
16

for

"urban

"Urban development" means a housing subdivision
involving more than fifteen residential units with an
average of less than one-acre per residential unit or a
commercial or industrial development for which cost
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases.
Id. at Section 10-1-104(11).
The following

facts pertinent to application of the

statutory provisions are undisputed and were presented to the
lower court:
(a) The

McDonald's

development

is

a

"commercial

development";
(b) At the time Salt Lake County approved McDonald's
conditional use permit, McDonald's was not the owner of the
subject property and had not yet paid the $300,000 it had promised
for the real property;
(c) The "cost projections" presented by McDonald's to
the Salt Lake County Commission and adopted by the Commission
included only the costs of the "shell" of the restaurant building
and excluded McDonald's cost projections of $300,000 for the real
property and the costs associated with making the generic building
"shell" into a McDonald's fast-food restaurant by adding permanent
fixtures without which there could be no restaurant, including,
but not limited to, booths, benches, grills, counter tops, french
fry

fryers, milk

shake dispensers, cash registers, "Golden

Arches," etc.;
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(d) A

professional MAI appraisal of the McDonald's

development shows that the projected costs, including costs for
real property and permanent fixtures, exceeded $950,000, and this
appraisal and the contents of this appraisal were considered by
the lower court below;
(e) No
permanent

other

fixtures

cost

were

projects

presented

for real property and

to

the

Salt Lake County

Commission or to the Court below;
(f) The real property at issue is within one-half mile
of Sandy City's municipal boundaries, lying in unincorporated Salt
Lake County;

required

(g)

Sandy City had

by

statute, wherein

willingness

to

annex

issued a Policy Declaration, as
Sandy

the property

City

had

expressed

its

at issue here under the

standards and requirements set forth by statute•
Even

though

the

statutory

definition

of

"urban

development" expressly includes cost projections of a commercial
development "for any or all phases" of that development, the court
below ruled that McDonald's cost projections for the development
phase of real property acquisition and for the development phase
of adding permanent fixtures, without which there could be no
McDonald's restaurant, should not be included as a matter of law
in

the

calculations

to determine whether

or not

the cost

projections "for any or all phases" of the development exceeded
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$750,000.

See Order, supra, at paragraph 2, p. 573, R.O.A.

In

other words, the lower court ruled that the statutory phrase, "for
any or all phases," did not really mean what it said, but rather
meant "some or part of" the phases of the development.
The term "phase" is defined in the dictionary as "a
stage or interval in a development; . . . an aspect or part (as of
a

situation

or

activity) being

subjected

to consideration,"

Webster's Third New International Dictionary, (Unabridged) at 1694
(1966), and as "any stage or form in a series of changes as in
development,"

Webster's New World Dictionary, Second Concise

Edition at 560 (1978).

The lower court either completely ignored

the standard, common, and ordinary mean of the term "phase," and
the

statutory

definition

requiring

consideration

of

cost

projections "for any or all phases," or, in the alternative, it
strictly interpreted the statutory definition to favor Salt Lake
County.

In either

event, the

lower court abrogated well-

established and precedential Utah law of statutory construction.
See West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446; Gord v. Salt Lake
City, 434 P.2d at 451; Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-2.
It is clear that the statutory phrase, "for any and all
phases," was used advisably by the Legislature.

It is critical

that all phases of a commercial development, including the costs
of land acquisition and the costs of adding permanent fixtures
which are absolutely essential for that development, be taken into
19

consideration

by

governmental

entities

in

projecting

the

governmental needs associated with a development in an urban area.
Doing such is required, sound public policy.

For example, a 1.3

acre parcel of land, the same amount of land which was to be
purchased

by McDonald's here, covered with

sagebrush west of

Delta, Utah, probably will not sell for $300,000 (unless gold,
oil, or natural gas in considerable quantity lie beneath it); but
1.3 acres targeted for a popular fast-food franchise at a major
intersection in a fast-developing area of Salt Lake Valley, with
commercial properties all around it, may indeed sell for $300,000.
The cost of land escalates as the potential for profit from its
use escalates.

A fast-food restaurant requires customers:

customers mean more profit.

more

The property located where potential

customers are plentiful (and profit potential is high) is more
valuable

than property

located where potential

customers are

scarce (and profit potential is low).
Thus, the high cost of commercial real property in an
urban area, in and of itself, more likely than not indicates a
future increase in motor vehicle traffic in the area, an increase
in the demand for municipal services

including

law enforcement,

traffic engineering improvements, upgrading roads, and indicates
future additional commercial development in the area, etc.

Thus,

omitting the cost projections for acquisition of real property in
a

commercial

development would
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inhibit proper and effective

governmental planning necessary to meet the needs created by that
development

in the urban area.

The same is true

for cost

projections for permanent fixtures.
Where projected costs for permanent fixtures in a fastfood restaurant are quite high, it is more likely than not that
the fast-food restaurant plans on high-traffic volume to generate
sufficient profits to cover the high costs.
entering

and

substantial

exiting

that

governmental

The increased traffic

property would
problems

create unique and

sufficient

to

warrant

legislative directives regarding urban development, and would be
sufficient to warrant inclusion of the cost projections for those
permanent fixtures into the total cost of a development in order
to assist the affected governmental entity in determining whether
the development is in fact an "urban development."

Absent those

cost projections, a true and accurate impression of the commercial
development would be impossible and the governmental entities
responsible

for providing governmental

services to that urban

development would be significantly hindered in planning for and
providing necessary services to that area.
The wisdom
evident.

of

the Legislature

thus

becomes self-

Cost projections for this kind of development must

include costs

for

"all phases" of the development

or proper

governmental planning and performance is seriously undermined.
And because the Legislature expressly identified municipalities as
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the preferred governmental entity responsible for and best-suited
to meet the public needs associated with commercial development in
urban areas, the lower court's ruling shows a glaring failure to
liberally construe Sections 10-2-418 and 10-1-104(11) in favor of
Sandy City, as was required by law.
Here, undisputed evidence put cost projections for land
acquisition
appraisal

by McDonald's

at

$300,000.

testimony put the development's

Undisputed

expert

construction costs,

including absolutely essential permanent fixtures, at $650,000 to
$850,000.

Thus, the total cost projections for the commercial

development in all of its phases easily surpassed the statutory
threshold of $750,000. The lower court's refusal to apply Section
10-2-418 was thus clearly erroneous and should be reversed.

2.

"Willing to Annex"
The lower court also held that

"Sandy City had not

expressed a willingness to annex the property that is the subject
of this lawsuit at the time that the McDonald's permit application
was approved."

See Order, supra, at paragraph 3.

This portion of

the ruling refers to Section 10-2-418, which conditions the denial
of approval or permit for an urban development on the following
condition:

". . . if a municipality is willing to annex the

territory proposed for such development under the standards and
requirements set forth in this chapter."
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Utah Code Ann. Section

10-2-418.
its

The lower court did not set forth the factual basis for

conclusion,

so

it must be assumed

that it adopted the

arguments presented by McDonald's and Salt Lake County below.
There, the

respondents argued that Sandy City must

affirmatively declare a specific willingness to annex particular
parcels of property or Section 10-2-418 does not apply to that
specific property.
38, R.O.A.

See McDonald's Memorandum, supra, at pp. 137-

No such requirement appears in the statute.

Adoption

of that argument by the lower court, again, constitutes a strict
interpretation of the statute and an application contrary to the
legislative objective clearly stated elsewhere in the chapter.
All

the

statutory

provision requires

is that Sandy City be

"willing to annex the territory proposed for [urban] development
under the standards and requirements set forth in this chapter."
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-418 (emphasis added).
The phrase "under the standards and requirements set
forth in this chapter" modifies the phrase "willing to annex" and
no other modification of the phrase "willing to annex" appears in
the provision.
here

impose

Thus, it is clear that the Legislature did not

upon

Sandy City an affirmative duty to express

formally by specific city ordinance or otherwise a willingness to
annex this particular, specific parcel of real property, but
rather, the Legislature simply required that Sandy City be willing
to annex this property according to the standards and requirements
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set forth in the State's annexation statutes.

It is undisputed

that

included

Sandy

City's

Policy Declaration, which

in its

general property description the parcels of real property here at
issue, conforms with the standards and requirements set forth in
the annexation statutes of the Utah Code. No other requirement is
imposed

upon

municipalities

by

the

statute.

Requiring

municipalities to do something other than as indicated in the
statute is an erroneous interpretation of Section 10-2-418 and
favors

the

unincorporated

municipality,

contrary

to

county government rather than the
the

legislative

objective of the

statute.
It is clear that if a municipality's annexation policy
and

procedures

are

not

consistent with

the

standards

and

requirements of the state code, then regardless of that city's
willingness to annex particular parcels of real property, whether
expressed by passage of a formal ordinance or otherwise, Section
10-2-418

simply

would not apply.

Where, however, a city's

annexation policies and procedures are consistent with the state
code standards and requirements, and the property in question is
included in a formal policy declaration by the city showing a
willingness

to annex that property, then the requirements of

Section 10-2-418 are satisfied and the provision applies.
was the case here.

Compare Sandy City Annexation Policy
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Such

Declaration, a copy attached to Sandy City's Verified Complaint,
supra, at pp. 23-25, R.O.A., with Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-417.
Sandy
requiring

City

complied

a willingness

requirements

of

the

with

to annex

Code.

the

statutory

under

In addition

the

provisions

standards

and

thereto, the cost

projections of the development "for any or all [of its] phases,"
exceeded the $750,000 threshold of the statute.

Such mandates

that this Court reverse the lower court's ruling and enter summary
judgment in favor of Sandy City.

POINT III
SALT LAKE COUNTY ACTED ULTRA VIRES, AND,
ACCORDINGLY, SANDY CITY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED
A.

Salt Lake County Acted in Excess of Its Authority
Salt Lake County has no authority to act contrary to the

general laws of the State of Utah.
Section

17-5-35.

See generally Utah Code Ann.

Article XI, Sections

4 and

5 of the Utah

Constitution grant powers to counties and municipalities only as
the Legislature prescribes.
and 5.

See Utah Const. Art. XI, Sections 4

Those sections of the Constitution also clearly establish

that municipalities are expected to annex property in order to
"furnish all local public services." Id. at Section 5.
This constitutional delineation of local authority finds
expression in the legislative policy declarations of Section 10-225

401, which are applicable here.

There it states clearly and

without

qualification

that municipalities

are

specifically

"created

to provide urban governmental services essential for

sound urban development and for the protection of public health,
safety and welfare in • • . commercial . . . areas and in areas
undergoing

development."

(emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann. Section

10-2-401(2)

Thus, the Legislature has given municipalities,

rather than counties, the governmental prerogatives when it come
to "areas undergoing development," and the courts are required
thereby to give due deference to municipalities in such areas.
Liberally

construing

Section

10-2-418

in order to

effectuate the expressed constitutional and legislative intent and
purpose

thereof,

it

is clear that Salt Lake County had no

authority from the State Legislature to approve the McDonald's
development
boundaries.

within

one-half

mile

of

Sandy City's municipal

With no statutory authorization

to approve the

conditional use application of McDonald's, Salt Lake County acted
in excess of its authority in approving that application and in
allowing McDonald's to construct its development in contravention
of

Sandy

City's

Development

Code.

Sandy City's prayer for

extraordinary relief from Salt Lake County's ultra vires action,
therefore, is simply that which is mandated by law.
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B.

Salt Lake County Violated Its Own Ordinances and Regulations
Salt

Lake

County

Ordinance

19 •84,090

sets

forth

"conditions for approval" of a conditional use permit by the
County.

Condition "D" thereof states:

"That the proposed use

will conform to the intent of the county master plan."
Ordinance 19.84.090, at p. 183, R.O.A.

See

Salt Lake County's error

here was that it had no county master plan in effect at the time
McDonald's applied for a conditional use permit and at the time
Salt Lake County approved that application.

Thus, the condition

set forth in this Salt Lake County ordinance was not satisfied,
and, contrary to the ordinance, Salt Lake County approved the
application.
The county master plan in question was a 10-year plan
approved and adopted in 1976.
1986, before McDonald's
conditional use permit.

By its own terms, it expired in

applied

to Salt Lake County

for a

Utah law requires that any extension of,

amendment or addition to a county master plan must be adopted
formally by the County's Planning Commission, recommended by the
Planning Commission to the County Commission, and then formally
adopted by the County Commission.

See Utah Code Ann. Sections 17-

27-6 and -6.5. There is no record of Salt Lake County's Planning
Commission or the Salt Lake County Commission ever extending,
amending or adding to the master plan here in question pursuant to
the statutory requirements.
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In fact, Salt Lake County's failure to have a plan in
place at all times pertinent here was in direct violation of Utah
Code Section 17-27-4, which mandates that "each county planning
commission shall make and adopt a proposed master plan for the
physical

development

of

the unincorporated

county."

Id. at Section 17-27-4.

territory of the

Salt Lake County's violation of

state statute and of its own ordinances here, makes its action
regarding McDonald's conditional use permit contrary to law and in
excess of its authority.

See Hopkins v. Md. Inmate Grievance

Comm'n. , 40 Md. App. 729, 391 A.2d 1213 (1978); Kassab v. Acho,
150 Mich. App. 104, 388 N.W.2d 263 (1986), appeal denied, 393
N.W.2d 874 (Mich. 1986); Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc.,
102 N.M. 614, 698 P.2d 887 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

C.

McDonald's
Restaurant

Had

Because

No Authority

Salt

Lake

County

to

Develop

acted

in

its

Fast-Food

excess

of

its

authority in approving McDonald's application, the approval has no
force and effect.

McDonald's then, has received no legitimate

government approval for its development, and, accordingly, the
development is unlawful.

Thus, the lower court's granting of

summary judgment in favor of McDonald's and Salt Lake County and
denying Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, must be
reversed.

This reversal would allow Sandy City to (a) annex the

property in question, and/or

(b) require McDonald's to obtain
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Sandy City approval of the development, providing McDonald's with
the governmental approval it needs for the development.
POINT IV
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY HERE AND
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SANDY CITY
BASED THEREON SHOULD BE REVERSED
What is sometimes referred to as "collateral estoppel"
is "more accurately described as the issue preclusion branch of
the doctrine of res judicata."
Rep. 13, 16 (Dec. 12, 1988).

Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv.

In Swainston v. Intermountain Health

Care, Inc.. 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Dec. 13, 1988), the Utah Supreme
Court set forth a four-pronged test which must be satisfied before
a court could bar consideration of issues allegedly determined in
a prior action.

That test is as follows:

1.
Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented in the
action in question?
2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3.
Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication?
4.
. . .
Was the issue in the
competently, fully, and fairly litigated?
97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26.

first

case

In Swainston,. the Court examined the

first step of the test to determine whether or not the issue
allegedly determined in an earlier action was identical to the
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issue in the case then before the Court.

The Court declared: "We

must determine 'whether the issues actually litigated in the first
action are precisely the same as those raised in the instant
action.'"

JEd., quoting Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. 635 P.2d

417, 419 (Utah 1981).

The determination made by the Swainston

Court was that if "there may be facts" in the first action which
"were not relevant" to the second action, even if those facts
create only minor differences, then the court in the second action
"must make its own assessment of the evidence in the law and rule
accordingly."

Swainston, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26 and 27.

Thus, if the issues presented in the two cases are not
"precisely the same," then the court in the second action should
not bar that second action on the basis of issue preclusion.

In

the case at bar, McDonald's and Salt Lake County argued below that
certain issues decided by the trial court in the Chevron Action
were binding on the lower court here and barred any determination
of

issues

presented

in

Sandy

City's

Verified

Complaint.

Apparently, the lower court agreed with McDonald's and Salt Lake
County.

Contrary to that determination, however, the Madsen and

Swainston decisions clearly show that where the issues are not
"precisely the same," issue preclusion does not apply.
A review of the issues in the instant case, comparing
the same with those reviewed by Judge Uno in the Chevron Action,
shows clearly that the issues are not "precisely the same," and
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that issue preclusion should not have been applied here.

The

Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Uno in the Chevron Action
specifically

referred only to the facts associated with the

Chevron development, the determination of cost projections for the
Chevron development, and whether or not specific statutes applied
to the Chevron development.
pp. 198-201, R.O.A.

See Copy of Memorandum Decision at

Here, the issue is whether separate and

distinct facts associated exclusively with the cost projections
for the McDonald's development, and facts pertaining exclusively
to McDonald's

application

for conditional use, require that

specific statutory provisions be applied only to the McDonald's
development.
The
acknowledged

differences
and

between the two cases were clearly

summarized

by the Deputy Salt Lake County

Attorney during oral argument in the Chevron Action:
McDonalds isn't a party to this lawsuit.
We don't know
anything about McDonalds. I don't have the foggiest notion
about what McDonald's plans are, except by a little heresy,
or how much it is going to cost for them to do it.
They weren't a part of Chevron's proceeding.
They
weren't a part of it in any way. Chevron made its own
application to the Planning Commission of Salt Lake
County. They had nothing to do with McDonalds.
See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings Had Feb. 5, 1988, a copy
attached

to McDonald's

Memorandum

of Points and Authorities

opposing Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support
of McDonald's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 453,
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R.O.A.

Accordingly, the issues here are different from those

issues presented in the Chevron Action, and the first element of
the issue preclusion test set by the Utah Supreme Court is not
satisfied.

According to Swainston, then, the trial court below

should have made "its own assessment of the evidence in the law
and rule[d] accordingly," rather than ruling as a matter of law
that issue preclusion barred Sandy City's Verified Complaint.

See

97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27.

POINT V
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY STRUCK AN AFFIDAVIT
SUBMITTED BY SANDY CITY IN SUPPORT OF
ITS CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In

its

Order denying

Sandy City's cross-motion

for

summary judgment and granting the motions for summary judgment
made by McDonald's and Salt Lake County, the lower court also
granted McDonald's motion to strike the affidavit and appraisal of
Gary Free, submitted by Sandy City in support of its cross-motion.
See Order, supra, at paragraph 5.

The lower court held that the

affidavit and appraisal failed to comply with Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule

703 of the Rules of

Evidence, but the lower court contradicted

its own ruling by

stating: "However, in ruling on the merits of the pending motions,
the

Court

has

considered

affidavit and appraisal."

and taken into account Mr. Free's

Id.
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The lower court cannot have it both ways.

Either the

affidavit and appraisal are inadmissible and, therefore, should
not

be

taken

into account, or, by taking the affidavit and

appraisal into account, the court overruled its determination that
the same were inadmissible.

By its considering the contents of

the affidavit and the appraisal, it was completely contradictory
and inappropriate for the court to grant a motion to strike the
same.

This Court must consider the same matters that the trial

court considered in reaching its determination.

For this Court to

honor the granting of the motion to strike and not review the same
matters that the lower court reviewed would be contrary to this
Court's obligations under the applicable standard of review.

See

generally Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d at 710.
The lower court also ruled that the expert appraisal
contained

in

the

affidavit and appraisal of Gary Free were

"without foundation and . . . based on inadmissible hearsay."
Order,

supra.

It

is

clear, however, that

See

sworn affidavit

testimony, which, if given at trial would be admissible, is also
admissible in affidavit form for purposes of summary judgment.
See Walker v. Rocky Mtn. Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah
1973).

The sworn affidavit testimony of Mr. Free, if given at

trial, would (a) qualify Mr. Free as an expert appraiser, and (b)
be admitted into evidence for the trier of fact to consider.

Rule

703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, upon which the lower court
33

relied

in granting

the motion

to

strike the affidavit and

appraisal, states clearly that expert opinion can be based upon
inadmissible facts or data, if such are of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject.

See Utah Rules of Evidence 703.

Thus, even though the data upon which Mr. Free relied in making
his

appraisal

were

hearsay,

if

such

are the type of data

reasonably relied upon by experts in the appraisal field, then the
same can justify and support Mr. Free's expert appraisal.
Mr. Free's affidavit and appraisal set forth expressly
that the data he relied upon in reaching his appraisal were data
reasonably relied upon by other experts in the appraisal field.
McDonald's never presented any contrary expert opinion or other
admissible evidence by affidavit to indicate that Mr. Free's
appraisal and the data upon which it was based did not comport
with industry standards.

Accordingly, Mr. Free's affidavit and

appraisal satisfied Rule 703 of the Rules of Evidence, and was the
type of testimony that the lower court would have allowed if the
testimony had been presented at trial.

See generally Wessel v.

Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d at 253 ("the critical factor in
determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert has
knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the
issues before it").

According to Utah law, then, the affidavit

and appraisal should not have been stricken by the lower court.
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Thus, because the lower court considered the content of
the affidavit and appraisal in contradiction of the Court's own
ruling,

and

because

the

lower

court erroneously

struck the

affidavit and appraisal in contravention of the Rules of Evidence
and case law decisions controlling the use of affidavits for
summary

judgment

purposes,

the

lower

court's

granting

of

McDonald's motion to strike the affidavit should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, as a matter of law,
Sandy City's motion for summary judgment should have been granted
by the lower court, and the summary judgments against Sandy City
granted in favor of McDonald's and Salt Lake County should not
have been granted, and should, therefore, be reversed on appeal.
Therefore, Sandy City respectfully requests that, there being no
dispute as to any material fact, and as a matter of law, summary
judgment in its favor should have been granted below, and that
this Court reverse the lower court's order and enter

summary

judgment in Sandy City's favor.
DATED t h i s

b ~~

day of March, 1990.
SMITH, REEVE & FULLER

Christojftier C ^ p y i l e r
Co-Counsel f o r l C p p e l l a n t
Sandy City
(4:<8>court®88-0500.apb)
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ADDENDUM "A"

Tnird Judicial District

\ 1989
CvCj'JI-TY

Daniel W. Anderson, A0080
Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm# A4570
Diane H. Banks, A4966
FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation
Twelfth Floor
215 South State Street
P. 0. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Telephone: (801) 531-8 900

b3>:„:./Cl3-k

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY CITY, A Municipal
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, A Political
Subdivision of the State of
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING
COMMISSION, MCDONALD'S
CORPORATION, and JOHN DOES 1-5,

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO
DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION'S
MOTION TO STRIKE, AND
DENYING SANDY CITY'S CROSS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. C88-03898
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants.
The hearing on McDonald's Corporation's Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment; McDonald's
Corporation's Amended Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment; Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment;
Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; and McDonald's
Corporation's Motion to Strike Affidavit and Appraisal of Gary
Free came before this Court on Monday, April 10, 1989 at 10:30
a.m.

Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm and Diane H. Banks appeared on behalf

of McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's"); Christopher Fuller and
Walter Miller appeared on behalf of Sandy City ("Sandy"); and
Kent Lewis appeared on behalf of Salt Lake County ("County").
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, documents
and exhibits filed by all parties on these matters, having heard
the arguments of counsel, and otherwise being fully advised,
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

McDonald's Motion to Dismiss is granted on the

ground that Sandy's action is untimely as a matter of law under
the doctrine of laches.
2.

Alternatively, McDonald's and the County's motions

for summary judgment are granted on all of the claims asserted in
Sandy's Verified Complaint filed herein.
3.

Sandy's claim under Section 10-2-418 of the Utah

Code ("Section 418") fails as a matter of law based on the
undisputed facts in the record, in that:
a.
the cost or value of land is not included in
calculating cost projections under Section 418 of
the Utah Code;
b.
the cost of furnishings, equipment and
fixtures is not included in calculating cost
projections under Section 418 of the Utah Code;
c.
the projected and actual costs of the
McDonald's restaurant at issue are less than
$750,000.00; and
d.
Sandy City had not expressed a willingness to
annex the property that is the subject of this
-2-

lawsuit at the time that the McDonald's permit
application was approved.
4.

As an alternative ground for granting McDonald's

and the County's Motions for Summary Judgment, Sandy is
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues relating to
its Section 418 claim, which were decided adversely to it in the
litigation involving Chevron in Civil No. C87-07304.
5.

McDonald's Motion to Strike the Affidavit and

Appraisal of Gary Free is granted as to the portions of Gary
Free's Affidavit and Appraisal relating to the cost of equipment
and improvements to the real property.

The Court finds that the

Affidavit and Appraisal fail to comply with Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, in that the opinions contained therein are without
foundation and are based on inadmissible hearsay.

However, in

ruling on the merits of the pending motions, the Court has
considered and taken into account Mr. Free's Affidavit and
Appraisal.
6.

There are no disputes of fact with respect to

Sandy's Title 57 Claim, Agency Claim, and Ordinance Claim (as
those claims are identified in the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of McDonald's Motion to Dismiss or in the
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Alternative for Summary Judgment) and the County and McDonald's
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims.
7.

Sandy's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment against

the County and McDonald's is denied.
8.

Sandy's Verified Complaint is hereby dismissed

with prejudice.
DATED this

of April 1989.
BY THE COURT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

/j

day of April 1989/

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070
Kent
Salt
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Salt

Lewis
Lake County Attorney
South State Street, Suite S3600
Lake City, Utah 84900-1200

-4-

Christopher C. Fuller
Durbano, Smith, Reeve & Fuller
4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 320
Ogden, Utah 84403
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ADDENDUM "B"

PART 4
EXTENSION OF CORPORATE LIMITS — LOCAL
BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS
10-2-401. Legislative policy.
The Legislature hereby declares that it is legislative policy that:
(1) Sound urban development is essential to the continued economic
development of this state;
(2) Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services
essential for sound urban development and for the protection of public
health, safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial
areas, and in areas undergoing development;
(3) Municipal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with specific standards, to include areas where a high quality of urban governmental services is needed and can be provided for the protection of public
health, safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation
and the proliferation of special service districts;
(4) Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate
standards should receive the services provided by the annexing municipality, subject to § 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the annexation;
(5) Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities, securing to residents
within the areas a voice in the selection of their government;
(6) Decisions with respect to municipal boundaries and urban development need to be made with adequate consideration of the effect of the
proposed actions on adjacent areas and on the interests of other government entities, on the need for and cost of local government services and
the ability to deliver the services under the proposed actions, and on
factors related to population growth and density and the geography of the
area; and
(7) Problems related to municipal boundaries are of concern to citizens
in all parts of the state and must therefore be considered a state responsibility.
History: C. 1953, 10-2-401, enacted by L.
1*79, ch. 25, } 2; L. 1983, ch. 247, * 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 19S3 amendmeat inserted "subject to section 10-2-424" in
Sub**ction (4).

Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1979,
ch. 25, § 2 repealed former § 10-2-401 (L.
1977, ch 48, I 2), relating to annexation of
contiguous territory, and enacted present
§ 10-2-401.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Appellant's
Brief by mailing four copies to Daniel W. Anderson and Diane H.
Banks at Fabian & Clendenin, 215 South State Street, Twelfth
Floor,

Salt

Lake

City, Utah

84151, attorneys

for Respondent

McDonald's Corp., and four copies to Kent Lewis, Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office, 2001 South State Street, Suite 53600, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84900, attorney for Respondent Salt Lake County, this
(p*Z-

day of March, 1990.
SMITH, REEVE & FULLER

by
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Christopher C.yjPulj.er
Co-Counsel for Appellant
Sandy City

